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CHAPTER 5
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS,
VIOLENCE AND SUFFERING: THE
ENVIRONMENTAL, PUBLIC
HEALTH AND SOCIAL IMPACTS
FROM COMPARATIVE CASE
STUDIES IN ZIMBABWE AND
UGANDA
Fernanda Claudio and Kristen Lyons
ABSTRACT
The present effects of transnational corporations (TNCs) on social, health,
and environmental aspects of local societies have a long history. The pre-
conditions for the insertion of the types of economic initiatives now seen in
the Global South, and driven by TNCs, were set through histories of colonial-
ism and development schemes. These initiatives disrupted local economies
and modiﬁed environments, delivering profound effects on livelihoods. These
effects were experienced as structural violence, and have produced social suf-
fering through the decades.
In this paper, we compare two African cases across time; the conjunction of
development initiatives and structural adjustment in the Zambezi Valley,
Zimbabwe in the early 1990s and industrial plantation forestry in present-day
Uganda. Each case presents a speciﬁc constellation of political and economic
forces that has produced prejudicial effects on local populations in their time
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period of application and are, essentially, different versions of structural vio-
lence that produce social suffering. While each case depicts a speciﬁc type of
violent encounter manifest at a particular historical moment, these are com-
parable in the domains of environmental impacts, disruptions to societies, co-
opting of local economies, disordering of systems of meaning and social
reproduction, and nefarious effects on well-being. We analyze the conjunction
of these effects through a theoretical lens of structural violence and social suf-
fering. Our analysis draws particular attention to the role of TNCs in driving
this structural violence and its effects.
Keywords: Structural violence; economic structural adjustment
programmes; transnational corporations; social suffering; environmental
impacts; health impacts
INTRODUCTION
In 1572, Luis de Camoes published The Lusiad, an epic poem of Portuguese
navigation which described with awe the discovery of “a new hemisphere and
new stars”, and passage through many lands where sailors witnessed “what
strangeness, but what qualities!” (De Camoes, 1572/2013, Canto V). These tales
of ﬁrst encounter depict the nature of the contradictory relationship between
western powers and African countries over the centuries; affection and exploita-
tion at one and the same time. As history tells, the pure wonders of discovery
soon turned to colonization and abuse of environments and populations. In the
midst of its magniﬁcence, the African continent has known a long history of
upheaval in the form of wars, land disputes, and exploitation of populations,
driven by both external and internal forces, and often combinations of both.
Almost no major form of abuse, from slavery and plantation systems to structural
adjustment and resource-based capital exploration, has been propagated by only
one player. Drawing from the intersection of political ecology and medical
anthropology, this paper conceptualises this historical  and contemporary 
abuse as structural violence. This violence is enabled via the convergence of
national and international forces, as well as public and private interests, and deliv-
ering profound social suffering.
This paper examines the forms and forces of structural violence through a
comparison of two African cases across time; the conjunction of development
initiatives and structural adjustment in the Zambezi Valley, Zimbabwe in the
early 1990s and industrial plantation forestry in present-day Uganda. In so
doing, we draw attention to the role of transnational capital at key historical
moments; the onset of structural adjustment in Zimbabwe, and the rapid
expansion of industrial forestry for carbon offset, thereby driving a particular
form of “green” structural transformation, in Uganda. Each case presents a
speciﬁc constellation of political and economic forces that have produced
prejudicial effects on local populations in their time period of application
and are, essentially, different versions of structural violence that produce
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social suffering. We assert that both structural adjustment policies in
Zimbabwe and industrial plantation forestry in Uganda follows a long his-
tory of violent colonial encounter, the events of which have produced a cas-
cade of social disruptions and providing platforms for new forms of
exploitation. Through a comparative spatial and temporal case study analysis
from Zimbabwe and Uganda, we argue the systemic features of structural
violence in dominant development approaches engender social suffering at
the local level.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS VIOLENCE
AND SOCIAL SUFFERING
Conceptualizing Violence
Violence has been conceptualized in a multitude of different ways. While some
analysis includes a focus on direct, embodied, immediate, and material violence,
others refer to violence as structural, terminology that captures the gradual and
insidious ways it can occur, with outcomes that may be invisible, or at least not
immediately apparent (Bohle & Funfgeld, 2007; Scott, 1998). While there is a
long history of direct violence associated with the development project (see
McMichael, 2017) as applied in the global south (including the destruction of
crops, sites of cultural signiﬁcance, murder and others  the conceptual focus in
this paper is upon the architecture of structural  or slow  violence that is
imposed through development schemes (Galtung, 1990).
Galtung (1969) used the term “structural violence” in the late 1960s, and in
so doing, distinguished those forms of violence that are built into, and arise
directly from, social systems. Transnational corporations (TNCs) are recognized
as signiﬁcant actors in establishing the basis for structuring violence into devel-
opment projects, by asserting new global power asymmetries that drive inequal-
ity and disadvantage. Structural violence is not necessarily visible or immediate,
but rather is stable, long-term and differential in terms of its higher impact on
lower social groups (Galtung, 1990). It is also distinct from inter-personal vio-
lence and is, of necessity, situated within political processes and action. In a later
article, Galtung and Höivik (1971) argued that if direct violence is measured in
deaths, then “structural violence is the difference between the optimal life expec-
tancy and the actual life expectancy”. In other words, the loss of opportunity to
live longer and healthier lives due to an absence of resources is one way to gauge
this form of violence that is otherwise not easily visible. On this basis, Galtung
differentiates so-called “non-spectacular” structural violence from other, direct
forms, including those that render the impacts of violence  to people and the
environment  clearly visible in material and often embodied ways (Galtung,
1990).
Building from this early work, Nixon (2011) has conceptualized structural
violence as slow; given the effects of such violence are often delayed over space
and time. Nixon asserts that while slow violence might be difﬁcult to recognize
via any immediate adverse impacts  similar to Galtung  its spectacle lies in
147TNCs, Violence and Suffering in Zimbabwe and Uganda
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the signiﬁcant social, cultural, and economic effects it garners over the long
term.
Structural and slow violence has been applied across political ecology litera-
ture, especially in burgeoning scholarship that documents processes driving land
grabs and neoliberal enclosures and their consequences (see for example,
Büscher, 2013; Fairhead, Leach, & Scoones, 2012). Privatization and enclosure
of territories is identiﬁed as driving resource conﬂicts, as well as giving rise to
diverse forms of resistance. Tienhaara (2012) and others also document the vio-
lent impacts at the local livelihood level on the basis of such enclosures. Local
and Indigenous people are identiﬁed as disproportionately bearing the costs of
development interventions in the form of structural, slow violence (see for exam-
ple Bottazzi et al., 2013; Daniel & Mittal, 2010).
CONCEPTUALIZING SOCIAL SUFFERING
While Galtung and Höivik ﬁrst highlighted violence in terms of its impacts on
life expectancy (as detailed above), other authors also reported its effects on
quality of life, namely in the realms of differential levels of suffering. This was
termed social suffering. While social suffering captures a difﬁcult and subjective
category, medical anthropology provides some useful distinctions to navigate
this nuance and complexity.
Medical anthropologists frame social suffering as a moral barometer
“intended to bring critical scrutiny to the ways in which the character of soci-
ety is exposed through the incidence of suffering” (Wilkinson & Kleinman,
2016). Social suffering is “a moral register of political and economic pro-
cesses that leave people materially disadvantaged, culturally undernourished,
and socially deprived. Social suffering takes place wherever harm is done to
human life” (Wilkinson & Kleinman, 2016, p. 14) and is expressed through
illness and/or distress amongst the disempowered (Wilkinson & Kleinman,
2016, p. 95).
Medical anthropologists, often on the frontlines of social inequality and bear-
ing witness to its negative health (and other) outcomes, proposed that structural
violence and suffering must be considered from broad geographical and histori-
cal perspectives (Farmer, 1997). From this view, one must acknowledge the
global forces at play that produce “a global economy of brutality” (Farmer,
1997, p. 274) in which dynamics of disempowerment result in continuous condi-
tions of suffering. Farmer further argued that to understand the impact of these
forces, consideration must also be given to various axes along which violence
develops; gender, ethnicity, race, class, and cultural difference. While it is true
that structural violence plays out at international, national and local scales, it is
at the local scale where differential impacts can be observed, and where variants
of social suffering are manifest.
In this way, social suffering provides a lens to understand the locally differen-
tiated experiences of slow and structural violence that emerge from political and
economic processes. This is the lens adopted in this paper. Before turning to the
selected cases of Zimbabwe and Uganda, we provide a brief review of the
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historical antecedent of the modernist development project (McMichael), which
we argue has created the current conditions for transnational capital to perpe-
trate violence and suffering.
DEVELOPMENT, VIOLENCE AND SUFFERING
The implicit understanding of any type of development is that improvement to
people’s lives will occur. The international development project has the objective
of improving lives; and with outcomes that are measurable via national indica-
tors, including gross domestic product (GDP) and various health indicators.
Central to this approach is economic advancement, which is widely understood
as a precursor to other kinds of development via a “trickle down” effect. Since
the post-World War II period, economic growth and development has been
enabled via nation states  in both interventionist and laissez faire ways,
depending on the policy preference of the day  as the basis for delivering posi-
tive outcomes at the local level (McMichael, 2017; Webster, 1990).
But history tells a different story, in which violence and social suffering fre-
quently accompany development  alongside the reordering of local people as
colonial and transnational subjects  resulting in deleterious effects to popula-
tions. This is particularly evident in the African colonial and post-colonial devel-
opment context, as we detail here. In this paper, we contend that structural
violence and suffering is inherent in international development initiatives and
their ascendant economic schemes, including those propagated by TNCs. We
demonstrate that the continuous post-World War II development project
(McMichael, 2017) between the global North and South has created a political
economy wherein economic schemes put forward by TNCs ﬁnd acquiescent and
compliant national governments. If the current state-of-affairs depicts structural
violence, which as Galtung (1969) argued is ensconced in political action, how
did this take place?
Encountering development, a post-development treatise written in the wake of
two decades of development initiatives in South America  and providing a pro-
found contrast to development norms and values that preceded it  explained
the concept of modern development that emerged after World War II. Its
author, Escobar, identiﬁed the development project as occurring in tandem with
the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine of 1949, and as part of the broad
American foreign policy agenda. This project was also backed by multilateral
institutions and global policies, including the Bretton Woods Agreement, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (later becoming the World Trade
Organization), as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank (Escobar, 1995). Escobar described the Marshall Plan as a way:
to bring about the conditions necessary to replicating the world over the features that charac-
terized the ‘advanced’ societies of the time-high levels of industrialization and urbanization,
technicalization of agriculture, rapid growth of material production and living standards, and
the widespread adoption of modem education and cultural values (Escobar, 1995, pp. 34).
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The author argued that the seemingly benevolent western development para-
digm greatly disadvantaged recipient countries through its forms of knowledge,
systems of power; and constructed subjectivities (Escobar, 1995, p. 10). The new
vocabulary of “poverty” with its attached ideas of mobility, vagrancy, promiscu-
ity, frugality, and ignorance laid the groundwork for management of the poor
through education, healthcare, hygiene, morality, employment, and child rearing
(Escobar, 1995, p. 23). Similarly, the tropes of “village” and “peasantry” and
associated concepts “small farmer” and “landless labourer” permitted “a broad
range of economic, political, and cultural, and discursive processes” (Escobar,
1995, p. 106). He further argued that relationships between clients and aid provi-
ders are “structured by bureaucratic and textual mechanisms”, or “documentary
practices” emblematic of the power relations within development (Escobar,
1995, p. 127). In his view, the disempowerment of recipient countries occurred
through reorganization of local economies towards market-oriented production,
and the concomitant commodiﬁcation of land, labor, and money, and “inven-
tion of the economy as an autonomous domain” (Escobar, 1995, p. 60). He
argued:
Economic men and women are positioned in civil societies in ways that are inevitably medi-
ated, at the symbolic level, by the constructs of markets, production, and commodities. People
and nature are separated into parts (individuals and resources), to be recombined into market
commodities and objects of exchange and knowledge Escobar (1995, p. 61).
As part of the global capitalist development project, new subjectivities were cre-
ated through violent encounters with colonial regimes, European modernity,
and post-colonial and post-Independence national projects. These each sup-
pressed local cultures, identities, and histories (Escobar, 1995, p. 214). We argue
that these processes of social and economic reinscription of local society occur
in both development schemes presented as case studies in this paper, as seen in
the Zambesi Valley of the 1990s, and in the actions of Green Resources in
present-day Uganda.
While Escobar delivered a strong critique of the development paradigm,
which he thought a failure, Ferguson (1994) took a less instrumental view in his
book The Anti-Politics Machine (Ferguson, 1994). Ferguson proposed that
rather than expecting development to be a coherent practice, histories, circum-
stances, and contingencies of each site of application should be examined. He
rejected the stance that development was “an institution whose fundamental
beneﬁcence” was a given as well as the neo-Marxist and neo-classical (Prebisch,
1981) view that development aimed to establish centre-periphery relations
(Ferguson, 1994, p. 13). Instead, he believed that development initiatives are
particular, and supported and maintained not by “capitalism” in the abstract,
but by historically speciﬁc political and economic interests in each case
(Ferguson, 1994, p. 14). The real story in his mind was not why development
schemes failed, or produced unintended consequences, but why the development
approach persisted. Whose interests did it serve? He contended that outcomes of
development projects are manifested:
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As unintended yet instrumental elements in a resultant constellation that has the effect of
expanding the exercise of a particular sort of state power while simultaneously exerting a
powerful de-politicizing effect Ferguson (1994, p. 21).
Whilst Escobar viewed international development approaches as instrumental
and coherent, and aimed at constructing a centreperiphery agenda deleterious
to the Global South, Ferguson saw no necessary intentionality in development
approaches, but recognized that a speciﬁc power agenda was at play in the seem-
ing fragmentation of programs. Our historical perspective leads us to agree with
both authors in their assessment of the fraught arena of interventions on local
populations, whether framed as development or capital initiatives. Inspired by
Escobar, we see that transnational economic schemes applied to countries with
weak economies in terms of ability to tax (Acemoglu, 2005) have negative
impacts at the local levels at which populations live and work. Economic struc-
tural adjustment in Zimbabwe seriously curtailed livelihood strategies in the
remote Zambezi Valley, especially when layered upon a resettlement scheme,
and industrial plantation forestry affected food security in Uganda. But, as
development specialists, we also acknowledge that the best laid schemes can go
awry once locally applied, and we highlight why there is a persistence of top-
down and locally uninformed schemes when these result in so much (recorded)
suffering.
RESEARCH METHODS
This paper examines the forms and forces of structural violence through a com-
parison of two African case studies across time; the conjunction of development
initiatives and structural adjustment in the Zambezi Valley, Zimbabwe in the
early 1990s and industrial plantation forestry in present-day Uganda. In so
doing, we draw attention to the role of transnational capital at key historical
moments; the onset of structural adjustment in Zimbabwe, and the rapid expan-
sion of industrial forestry for carbon offset, thereby driving a particular form of
“green” structural transformation, in Uganda.
The ﬁrst case study presented in this paper is a development project in the
Dande area of the Zambezi Valley, Zimbabwe. Eighteen months of ethno-
graphic ﬁeldwork was conducted during 1992 and 1993 on the local impacts of
combinations of development schemes and a severe drought. In this paper, we
focus on one development scheme, the Mid-Zambezi Valley Rural Resettlement
Project (MZP), while at the same time acknowledging that the ethnographic
approach elicited the complexity of disruption to local livelihood, political, and
family systems in the area (including beyond this speciﬁc scheme that forms the
focus of this paper). The site of this case study was Chikafa village, situated at
the intersection of the Manyame River and the Mozambican border. Data were
gathered through two household surveys conducted in mid-1992 and mid-1993
(before and after a serious drought), attendance at village meetings related to
health, land, and drought relief, attendance at spirit possession ceremonies,
interviews with leaders and residents, and participation in local activities such as
cotton-picking, cooking, gathering ﬁrewood, attending religious gatherings, use
151TNCs, Violence and Suffering in Zimbabwe and Uganda
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of public transport. In all, the data gathered encompassed approximately 200
residents.
The second case study presented in this paper is a TNC-led development
project to establish industrial plantation forestry in Uganda. We draw from
ﬁeldwork with one TNC  Green Resources, a private Norwegian company
engaged in forestry plantations, carbon offset, forest products, and renewable
energy. This provides a case to explore the violence and social suffering associ-
ated with private sector plantation forestry in Uganda. Green Resources is
engaged in activities in Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda claims to have
planted more trees than any other private company in the last 10 years  with
over 40,000 ha of standing plantation forestry  and to have invested over US
$125 million in tree planting in Africa (Green Resources, 2018).
In Uganda, Green Resources has obtained licenses to engage in plantation
forestry in two Central Forest Reserves; the Bukaleba Forest Reserve in
Mayuge District, and the Kachung Forest Reserve in Dokolo District, covering
a total of 6,721 ha. Research methods included interviews with representatives
from central and local government, environmental non-government organiza-
tions, journalists, and company representatives. It also included two ﬁeld visits
to both Bukaleba and Kachung Central Forest Reserves, and spread over a year
between 2012 and 2013. At each of these sites, focus group meetings were under-
taken in nine villages (with between 7 and 30 people in attendance at each focus
group). Three of these villages are located in the license area at Bukaleba, while
six villages are located on the edges of the plantations at Bukaleba and
Kachung. In total, at least 150 community members living in or adjacent to the
plantation forestry sites were included in this research. These primary data were
supplemented with the analysis of documents, including annual reports, policy
documents and company publications (Fig. 5.1).
CASE STUDY 1: ZIMBABWE: STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT DURING THE 1990s
Zimbabwe is a country in ﬂux. Its populations have experienced disruptions to
their social, economic, and political lives for centuries, particularly as foreign
powers, including transnational capital, have attempted to secure control over
land. The fall of the Munhumutapa state to the Portuguese in 1629 led to their
subsequent control over parts of the Zambezi through alliance with local heredi-
tary chieftaincies (Newitt, 1995). The Chimurenga (liberation) wars with the
British South Africa Company of the late nineteenth century led to British con-
trol of the country until 1963, when the Unilateral Declaration of Independence
was made by the white minority leadership, led by Ian Smith who sought
national self-determination, but whose government did not represent the African
majority population. Each of these events led to control over land and economy,
and to social disruptions in the form of labour migration. Since 1980, in the
post-colonial era, Zimbabwe has been the site of various initiatives to improve
the state of the economy. Amongst these initiatives, the International Monetary
Fund’s economic structural adjustment programme of the late 1980s, which was
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Fig. 5.1. Map of Zimbabwe. Location; Highway; Water Body; Protected Area; National Boundary.
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known locally as “hapanasadza” (no food) and “ESAP: Europeans suffer,
Africans perish”.
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND VIOLENCE
During the 1980s, economic structural adjustment initiatives were applied glob-
ally to a selection of developing and developed countries with mixed results.
Generally, the effects were negative and produced reduced standards of living in
developing countries. In developed countries, the results were mixed. For exam-
ple, a structural adjustment programme applied to the New Zealand economy
during the 1990s produced negative effects on poverty and health (Kelsey,
1997), while the South Korean experience rendered positive results both socially
and economically (Haggard, Pinkston, & Jungkun, 1999). The Korean case is
speciﬁc in that the combination of strong and centralised governance, compli-
ance of the business sector, and strong oversight by government agencies
resulted in improved economic outcomes (Haggard et al., 1999). In African
countries, where histories of colonial disruptions, contradictory relationships
between centralized and prescriptive governments and policies of decentraliza-
tion promoted by structural adjustment programmes, results were mostly nega-
tive. There, structural adjustment was applied under the guise of development,
and with the promise of producing employment, better access to consumables,
facilitation of mobility and participation in the economy, and ultimately higher
standards of living for populations. Yet history has recorded the opposite effect
in African countries, delivering structural violence in the form of low economic
performance across a range of indicators, particularly in terms of poverty and
food production (Sahn, Dorosh, & Younger, 1997). Structural adjustment also
prejudiced health, especially for women and children, as a result of reductions in
health spending and education, removal of subsidies on basic foods, and frag-
mentation of families due to labor migration (Logie & Woodroffe, 1993).
In Zimbabwe, economic structural adjustment was applied in the late 1980s,
with outcomes that failed to bring about beneﬁts for the population. By this
time ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front), the party
that won the Independence War as a result of key support by rural populations,
had been in power for almost a decade and needed the political gain of an
improved economy. Structural adjustment promised to improve conditions for
rural populations and on this basis was welcomed by the ruling party. However,
its impact on the agriculturally based economy was especially negative. In terms
of agricultural policies, at ﬁrst there were beneﬁts from the incorporation of
African farmers into “the state-marketing system […] through marketing depots,
crop collection points and extension services in the communal area and making
modern crop development packages available through Agritex” (Gibbon, 1996).
At this time, Zimbabwe’s African smallholders produced about half of
Zimbabwe’s export maize, and a large proportion of cotton. This level of pro-
duction and distribution was made possible by the existence of the centralized
Grain Marketing Board (GMB), which collected and distributed crops. In 1991,
the World Bank objected to the GMB, arguing that the cost of services in rural
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areas was uneconomic and counter-productive, especially given the number of
remote depots, and the shipping costs involved (Gibbon, 1996). As a result, the
GMB was forced to reduce grain depots around the country, as well as reducing
staff and maize stocks. When the great drought of 19911992 occurred, the
GMB had to import large amounts of grain (Gibbon, 1996). In addition to
modiﬁcations of the GMB, the World Bank also drove market deregulation,
including partially decontrolling trade in the staple white maize (to enhance the
position of independent traders), and “to eliminate all controls and restrictions in
the trade in beef, dairy products, cotton, oil seeds and yellow maize” (Gibbon,
1996).
There were widespread repercussions of these measures for the whole farming
sector in Zimbabwe. Commercial farmers found it more proﬁtable to switch
from maize crops to tobacco (from 31% cultivating tobacco to 79%), as well to
engage in horticulture to produce vegetables and ﬂowers for export. This sector
employed 300,000 workers, and so any changes that affected employment would
have important repercussions for communal areas, whose residents engaged in
labor migration. In conversation during the early 1990s, a young white farmer
who managed a farm approximately 50 km outside of Harare stated he would
prefer to grow “food” (meaning maize) instead of the more lucrative tobacco.
Communal areas, already suffering from the effects of serious drought, also lost
their grain collection points. This caused many problems and suffering for small
farmers, “as marketing through the GMB became more physically difﬁcult for
them and more turned as anticipated to small-scale private traders” (Gibbon,
1996). This situation rendered small farmers, without their own means of trans-
port, and in the absence of local cooperatives, vulnerable to the exploitation of
traders.
Structural adjustment also affected the Cotton Marketing Board (CMB), and
in the years from 1989 to 1992 cotton prices fell. With the new export market-
led approach, the CMB found it more proﬁtable to sell cotton lint overseas,
rather than to supply local spinners in Harare, thereby putting the spinning
sector in ﬁnancial difﬁculties and risking job cuts. Political intervention avoided
this circumstance, but this case also illustrated the drawbacks of a purely export
market-led approach (Gibbon, 1996).
Structural adjustment rejected the protectionist approach, which the indus-
trial sector had inherited from the Rhodesian regime because of structural pro-
blems, which it said, prevented growth. Pre-Independence and well into the
1980s, the industrial sector, which was varied and included, for example, phar-
maceuticals and agricultural input companies, had access to local capital and
beneﬁted from foreign exchange controls. This sector developed in part due to
foreign sanctions on trade with Rhodesia which stimulated local production of
consumables for the domestic market. In contrast, structural adjustment pre-
scribed rejection of protectionist foreign exchange policies and encouraged liber-
alization of foreign investment, reduction of national budgets, and reinvestment
in equipment all of which accommodated the interests of TNCs. In other words,
ESAP suggested a restructuring of production that would include reduction of
employees across sectors (Gibbon, 1996).
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As Nyabereka (2017) found, GDP growth in the wake of structural adjust-
ment did not meet targets to improve local livelihoods (except for 1994).
Austerity measures had a negative impact on individuals and families who
depended on wages and public services, and produced progressive underdevelop-
ment (Nyabereka, 2017; Scoones, Melnyk, & Pretty, 1992) (Fig. 5.2).
This history of structural adjustment produced struggling economies with
social inequality, suffering and impoverished populations, which became vulner-
able to constellations of development, economic, and transnational initiatives.
The effects of failed economic strategies can be measured in poor production,
joblessness and other indicators, but what of the effects on populations? We
frame these effects as violent encounters structured into policies that reduce
quality of life, including of health, and opportunities for education and employ-
ment. Structural adjustment policies could not be applied without the agreement
and cooperation of national governments in Africa (and as evidenced elsewhere)
that tend to have top-down governance approaches. The complex web of inter-
ests at play in the application of these nefarious plans to whole populations,
with little regard for their health and social outcomes, is also present in the case
of the actions of TNCs in African countries today. One problem is corruption,
which can be mitigated through civic action (Mondlane, Claudio, & Khan,
2016). Another problem is the policy void left by poorly redistributed national
budgets in these countries that is ﬁlled by foreign development and capital
schemes. Another problem is the legislative frameworks that allow for initiatives
that have little good and potentially much negative impact on populations. We
are interested in the empty spaces in governance of African countries; in eco-
nomic policies devoid of local logic and ahistorical in their lack of consideration
for the lessons of colonialism, and in legislative frameworks that do not mandate
Fig. 5.2. Gross Domestic Product Growth Compared to Actual Targets. Sources:
Adapted from UNDP, World Bank and African Development Bank databanks.
Note: *19911992 and 1995 were affected by severe drought (Nyabereka, 2017).
Zimbabwe’s target and recorded annual GDP growth from 1991 to 1995.
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and enforce appropriate impact assessment to protect their populations. Their
similar entanglement with transnational forces, in which they have little voice,
and which produce suffering, links Zambezians of the 1990s and contemporary
Ugandans.
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND THE MAKING
OF SUFFERING
As outlined earlier, structural adjustment weakened the agricultural production
base in Zimbabwe during the 1990s and caused unemployment and attendant
withdrawal of government supports in education and healthcare. These were
national level policies that played out at the local level, as we will describe in
this section. Nyabereka (2017) noted that in the rush to implement structural
adjustment programmes, the Bretton Woods institutions neglected to provide
lasting social, economic, and political development. The violence associated
with structural adjustment in Zimbabwe in the early 1990s at the local level
produced vulnerabilities within society such that the perfect storm of drought
(19911992) and development precipitated hardship not seen since the
Independence War, which ended in 1979. These development schemes reduced
political representation, as well as disrupting environments and local economies,
and generating food insecurity and social inequality. Zambezians suffered struc-
tural violence at three scales during the 1990s: international, national, and local.
Clear examples of these disruptions included fragmentation of families in search
of food when crop failure could not be mitigated by traditionally held grain
stores because the GMBs had ended. Hunger in rural areas, including in the
Zambezi, became a feature of life due to the combination of local crop failure,
absence of grain stores, and lack of jobs in areas of traditional seasonal labor
migration. In the ethnographic area here discussed, a cholera outbreak was a
most striking outcome of hunger caused by the combination of drought and
socioeconomic disruptions brought about by structural adjustment.
Suffering happened because of drought and economic structural adjustment,
but an ill-timed development scheme exacerbated an already problematic situa-
tion. We have seen how the IMF promoted structural adjustment in Zimbabwe
with the cooperation of the Zimbabwean government. While Zimbabweans
were affected by the withdrawal of services including education, healthcare,
employment, and others, many could expect support from family-based agricul-
tural activities in the regional areas. However, in the Zambesi Valley, a conjunc-
tion of drought, structural adjustment, and a resettlement scheme severely
disrupted lives and led to much suffering.
How did this structural violence occur? During the late 1980s, the Zambesi
Valley, an area historically considered to be marginal by both British and
Rhodesian regimes, became a focal point for development. Colonial attempts at
cotton cultivation had faltered, and the presence of tsetse ﬂy until the early
1990s precluded keeping of cattle. Very poor infrastructure in terms of roads,
electricity, and telephones impeded communication. Few schools and under-
equipped health clinics meant that services could barely support the existing
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population. Its harsh environment with poor soils, extreme heat, malarial mos-
quitos, and profusion of wild animals, made conceiving of dense human habita-
tion almost impossible.
Given these inhospitable conditions, why in the late 1980s, was the Zambesi
Valley suddenly considered suitable for development? One reason was population
pressure on the plateau where Communal Areas had become degraded and
lacked water. Another reason was the fact of a young underemployed  given
very few employment options in the Valley  population needing livelihood
opportunities. But perhaps the greatest reason was the fact that the Zimbabwean
leadership had achieved power by winning a guerrilla war based on control over
land and its equitable redistribution. They did so with crucial backing of rural
populations who had fed, sheltered and ritually supported rebel guerrillas, espe-
cially in the vast Zambesi Valley. Ten years on from Independence, the fact that
the African Development Fund would ﬁnance a land resettlement program dove-
tailed nicely with the government’s own political needs. But, as we describe
below, the resettlement scheme added another dimension of hardship to the lives
of Zambesians.
MID-ZAMBESI VALLEY RURAL DEVELOPMENT
PROJECT (MZP): DESIGN
According to the “Appraisal Report: Mid-Zambesi Valley Development Project
Zimbabwe” (1986), the objectives of the project were the following:
To develop the Mid-Zambesi Valley, a communal area, in accordance with Government
policy contained in the Five-Year (19861990) National Development Plan; to settle 3,000
families and to improve the living conditions of these plus the 4,600 families already resident
in the project area through the provision of agricultural services, and physical and social infra-
structures; to increase crop production thus insuring self-sufﬁciency in food and cash incomes
for the farming community and contributing to the earning of foreign exchange for the econ-
omy through exports; and to conserve and utilize the natural resources of the area African
Development Fund (1986, p. 24).
The MZP was a rural resettlement program with a top-down design. Its immedi-
ate objective was to promote cash-cropping of cotton. Curiously, the project
aimed to resettle households within what oral histories described as longstanding
(about 100 years) lineage-based residential areas. In fact, the project aimed to
reconﬁgure residential patterns such that already existing lineage-based settle-
ment would make way for migrant families from environmentally degraded
plateau areas in Zimbabwe. Each household was to be given 12-acre plots to
cultivate, and a 0.5-acre residential plot. Around 3,000 newcomer families
were to be settled in 130 villages of between 20 and 25 households (Fund,
1986). The boundaries of the project area fell within the districts of Guruve
and Muzarabani in Mashonaland Central Province. Because assessment
methods were ﬂawed (census ﬁgures as well as aerial photographs used were
outdated), the MZP had to accommodate an additional 2,500 households into
its plans (Derman, 1990).
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The MZP was administered through the Ministry of Local Government and
Rural and Urban Development and the Department of Rural Development
Division. The demarcated project area “was a strategic area during the war and
important for the victory of the liberation forces. Both ZANU and ZAPU
(Zimbabwe African People’s Union) were very active here” (Derman, 1990).
Within the MZP design, new villages, clinics, and schools were to be constructed
near boreholes. Each village was to have a communal grazing area, and num-
bers of animals were to be controlled through a permit system (Fund, 1986). In
short, the MZP aimed to change the system of land ownership. In pre-colonial
and colonial eras, land distribution was done by Zambesian headmen and spirit
mediums. Land allocation procedures changed in 1985 with the creation of the
Provincial Councils and Administration Act extending powers to distribute land
to Ward Councilors and Village Development Committee chairpersons. Thus,
in practice in the early 1990s, a combination of hereditary and elected represen-
tatives deliberated on land use which was based on Usufructuary right.
Effectively, the MZP transferred land use governance away from locally imbed-
ded authorities to project planners and district level decision-makers who had
no local engagement.
While the MZP encompassed the entire Mid-Zambesi region, the site of this
analysis is Chikafa, including one of six villages belonging to Zvaitika Village
Development Committee, one of four village development committees within
Neshangwe Ward.1 Two lineage-based groups, the Chikunda, whose ancestors
had conquered the area in the late 1900s, and the Korekore governed Chikafa.
A hereditary headman who was Chikunda governed alongside the Chairman
who was Korekore. The MZP met with much resistance in this area. The
Chairman had assisted in designating (pegging) about 200 ﬁelds of 12 acres
each for resettlement by Chikafa residents, but these ignored the new demarca-
tions and refused to move, complaining of poor soil and lack of water. The
project then proposed four other areas, which were also rejected by the popula-
tion who rallied several local politicians, including the provincial governor,
Member of Parliament and AGRITEX (Agricultural Technical and Extension
Services of the Ministry of Agriculture in Zimbabwe) to protest resettlement.
The village hereditary headman, sabhuku Chikafa vowed that residents would
never move to proposed areas stating, “there is no sadza (food) there”.
While the majority of the population refused to accept the MZP, local frac-
tures in the social organization of the village occurred. Inﬂuential residents from
the two dominant lineages were offered plots in the most fertile areas, which
they eventually accepted. A second group of newcomers from a defunct mining
area on the plateau was also resettled. However, the bulk of the population
refused successive offers of poor lands, while the ongoing battle to avoid resettle-
ment took its toll in anxiety and distress. The new farming approaches pre-
scribed by the project especially took their toll. These included moving away
from riverbanks that sustained gardens that fed families during the dry season,
and ensured survival during cyclical droughts. Also, the project aim of encour-
aging cotton cultivation caused anxiety because of the necessary ﬁnancial invest-
ment in inputs (seed, chemicals, and tools) and the labor intensive aspect, which
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would reduce time for food crop cultivation. Past collective experience of cotton
cultivation failure in the Zambesi instigated by both the British and Rhodesian
regimes, also contributed to anxieties with the MZP. Residents expressed desire
to earn cash to pay for schooling, health care, transportation and other items.
Cotton cultivation was in its infancy in 1993, and only done by households from
the two dominant lineages who could afford the monetary and labor costs: of
93.5 acres under cotton cultivation in Chikafa, 39.50 (42%) were owned by the
Chikunda and 44.50 (48%) by the Korekore. No one made proﬁt from cotton at
that time.
In a marginal area with little opportunity to participate in the cash economy,
why did Zambesians resist a cash crop scheme? The short answer is that people
understood their great vulnerability within a harsh environment of poor soils,
precarious water sources, and cyclical drought. Their livelihood and survival
strategies included diversiﬁcation of agriculture between dryland and riverine
crops. Maize was the staple food and its importance cannot be overstated.
During the rainy season, villagers cultivated maize in both dryland and riverine
ﬁelds, which they dried to eat during the dry season. Maize is synonymous with
life in this area; it represents both sustenance and social continuity. Maize is
also brewed into ritual beer and drunk during ceremonies that foster and afﬁrm
local identity and social cohesion. During the severe drought of 19911992, a
shortage of maize meant suspension of all social rituals, except for the annual
rain-making ceremony which was considered to be urgent. One hundred thirty-
six acres of maize were cultivated in Chikafa in 1993, 83.50 acres owned by the
Chikunda (55%) and 57.50 (38%) by the Korekore. Thus, these two groups, who
were the traditional keepers of both wealth and ritual and hereditary power,
were threatened by cotton cultivation. Additional sources of food included millet
and sorghum dryland cultivation, which was intercropped with pumpkin, and
riverine gardens which produced vegetables including cabbage, sweet potato,
tomatoes, beans, onions, various leafy greens, and chilies. Gardens were labor-
intensive, but enabled survival in drought years. Chickens and goats provided
sources of protein, although the latter caused many disputes related to damaged
crops.
Cotton cultivation affected household production of food in a similar way
to drought; decreases in maize production precipitated a greater investment in
the relatively easy-to-cultivate riverine gardens. But, and as discussed above,
gardens provided food that was complementary to the sustaining food crop,
maize, and survival food during droughts. Thus, intensiﬁcation of garden pro-
duction was a sign of increased fragility of food security.
While the MZP espoused a discourse of empowerment through the economic
promise of cotton cultivation, in its infancy this scheme created hardship for
resettled families and great uncertainty for those who resisted resettlement. The
occurrence of a serious drought in 19911992 served to both exacerbate the
weaknesses of the project and highlight the fragility of the population’s relation-
ship with the environment.
In Escobar’s terms, the MZP created new subjectivities, including individual
economic empowerment. However, such subjectivities did not work in the fragile
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Zambezian environment, where livelihoods were based on deep historical knowl-
edge of the environment and social relations. Settlements patterns, centered on
the households of lineage elders, were composed of relatives who farmed together
with a gender-based division of labor that fostered a diversiﬁed approach to
food, including maize and vegetable cultivation, ﬁshing, bush foods and some
seasonal labor migration. The MZP stipulated that arable plots should all be of
the same size irrespective of household size, that ﬁelds were situated away from
rivers, and that the names of settlements should be changed from family names
into descriptive terms or letters. Residents resisted these new designations citing
loss of identity. They also resisted threats to the established political hierarchy
brought by the MZP, which provided scope for younger residents and newcomers
to have a political voice, while at the same time creating uncertainty. Loss of time-
tested governance structures also increased observable fragility of livelihoods, and
increased vulnerability to environmental conditions. These circumstances, in
combination, fostered resistance to the MZP.
The legacy of the combination of structural adjustment, poorly designed
development schemes and poor governance in Zimbabwe has led to a fragile
economy vulnerable to exploitative capital. This has been manifest in diverse
forms of social suffering, as detailed above. While valiant efforts to resist
socially meaningless and potentially destructive economic schemes take place at
the local level, what about at the national level? Signiﬁcant threats to local liveli-
hoods in Zimbabwe now take the form of mid-level TNCs that are registered
and active in countries with poor legal frameworks that do not protect people.
Green Fuel is one such company now active in Zimbabwe in the agricultural
sector where traditional systems of local governance are co-opted to sign over
huge areas of locally owned land that support livelihoods in the absence of a
functioning national economy (Hobbes, 2016). A longstanding habit of struc-
tural violence in Zimbabwe, and a lack of care for the social suffering of its
people have paved the way for the insertion of capital schemes that precipitate
further harm.
CASE STUDY TWO: INDUSTRIAL PLANTATION
FORESTRY IN UGANDA
The Entry of Transnational Capital Into Industrial Plantation Forestry
In Uganda, similar to Zimbabwe and elsewhere, foreign investment for develop-
ment has been institutionalized via processes and policies at both the international
and national levels (Mamdani, 1987) (Fig. 5.3). As Wiegratz (2010, p. 128)
describes, Uganda’s economic reforms have been driven by a domestic power elite
and foreign interests committed to “the unregulated market is best” doctrine. At
the international level, structural adjustment and trade liberalization programs
have integrated Uganda within the international economy, creating new forms of
dependency and obligation. Meanwhile at the national level, a number of pro-
grams, introduced since the 1980s, have facilitated the liberalization and privatiza-
tion of national economic activities.
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The introduction of the “Economic Recovery Program” in the mid-1980s, for
example, aimed to transition Uganda from a peasant to modern industrial econ-
omy (Wiegratz, 2010). This introduced new “business friendly laws” for invest-
ment, as well as driving the privatization of most state-owned businesses. The
expansion of international investment has also been supported by a number of
other institutional mechanisms, including the Constitution of the Republic of
Uganda (1995, and amended 2005), which provides legal policy and infrastruc-
ture for private investment, as well as the Uganda Investment Authority and the
Uganda Revenue Authority, each established to assist transnational capital
investment (Bomuhangi, Doss, and Meizen-Dick, 2012). Turning to industrial
plantation forestry  the second case study presented in this paper  foreign
investment in the form of transnational capital has come to play a central role
in sectoral expansion.
The Ugandan National Forestry Authority (NFA) identiﬁed declining forest
cover  estimated as occurring at around 6,000 ha each month (World Wide
Fund for Nature, 2013)  as a primary national environmental challenge.
Deforestation is also linked to other environmental problems, including soil ero-
sion, biodiversity loss and climate change, and Norwatch (Norwatch, 2011)
warns Uganda will face acute timber shortages within the next 10 years.
In this context, central government managed Central Forest Reserves have
become a primary focus for national re-afforestation efforts, with private inves-
tors identiﬁed as key actors in driving afforestation according to a National
Forestry Authority representative. National Forestry Authority policy docu-
ments also describe foreign investment in plantation forestry as creating local
employment and economic growth, while the National Forestry Policy (2001)
and the National Forestry and Tree Planting Act (2003) articulate support for
private investment in forestry development (Republic of Uganda, 2003).
This policy-enabling setting has occurred alongside the expansion of transna-
tional capital investment in Uganda’s forestry industry. Demonstrating this,
since at least 2005, international private sector investment has supported the
establishment of an estimated 100,000 hectares under forestry plantations in
Uganda, a ﬁgure NFA aims to increase up to 250,000 hectares by 2050
(National Forestry Authority representative, 2012). Norwegian owned planta-
tion forestry company Green Resources is an exemplar case of the movement of
transnational capital into Africa, claiming to have planted more trees than any
other private company.
Violence has been a historical feature at each of these sites licensed to Green
Resources as part of the acquisition of land and management of industrial for-
estry operations (Lyons et al., 2014; Lyons & Westoby, 2014b). We explore this
below.
INDUSTRIAL PLANTATION FORESTRY, SLOW
VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL SUFFERING
It is necessary to provide a brief background to the contemporary contestation
related to access and use rights for local people in forest reserves now licensed to
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Green Resources. The early post-colonial period set the stage for local villagers
use and access rights to public lands. A number of Acts (including the 1962
Public Land Act and the 1969 Public Lands Act), for example, permitted local
communities to occupy public land for agricultural purposes, and without prior
consent from the government. During the Idi Amin regime (19711979)  and
supported by the 1975 Land Reform Decree  farmers were also encouraged to
occupy public land, including forested land, to improve household self-
sufﬁciency and reduce pressure upon the state. The Amin government (and later
Milton Obote during his second regime), also reportedly distributed portions of
protected areas to communities (Okuku, 2006, pp. 1011; Turyahabwe &
Banana, 2008). Central Forest Reserves (established between the 1930s and
1950s) were amongst those land holdings distributed by Amin.
As evidence of this land redistribution, at a number of villages at both
Bukaleba and Kachung Central Forest Reserve, villagers described a familial
connection dating back to the 1950s. Villagers discussed burial grounds and cul-
tural sites, as well as housing and trading centres, as evidence of their connection
to places now recognized as being within the company license area. Community
members also described long standing access and use rights; including for animal
grazing, ﬁshing, as well as the collection of ﬁrewood, spear grass and medicinal
herbs, as well as access to watering holes (Lyons & Westoby, 2014a)
The introduction of policies in the early 2000s  including the 2001 National
Forestry Policy and the 2003 National Forestry and Tree Planting Act (Ministry
of Lands of Water, Lands and Environment, Republic of Uganda, 2001) 
represented a turning point in policy approaches, by articulating a commitment
to the privatization of both forestry and public lands. This was part of a broader
neoliberalisation of Ugandan policy and development approaches that was
occurring during this period (Wiegratz, 2010). Such policies, and the privatizing
agenda they embodied, have driven structural violence and local level suffering,
including as local villagers are punished for “illegal encroaching” and “trespas-
sing” onto land that was once vital for local food growing and grazing, but is
now licensed to  and controlled by  foreign transnational companies.
PRIVATIZATION OF LAND DELIVERS SOCIAL
SUFFERING
Signiﬁcant adverse local level livelihood impacts occurred alongside the arrival
of Green Resources. To begin, many community members describe the destruc-
tion of crops, housing, and local trading centres to make way for the company’s
plantation activities. Since the early days of eviction, community members also
described ways the company  often aided by police and government ofﬁcers 
constrained access and use of land in and around the plantation areas. The
impact has created an acute food insecurity crisis, with villagers describing land
shortages for growing food and grazing animals. Similarly, villagers also
described suffering on the basis of their constrained access to ﬁrewood and
water. Some local villagers also described being arrested for “trespassing” onto
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the companies’ plantation to grow crops, graze animals, or collect ﬁrewood,
with penalties that included both cash ﬁnes and jail sentences.
Villagers at Bukaleba also described social suffering through the destruction
of burial sites to make way for the forestry plantation. As a consequence of relo-
cation alongside the arrival of Green Resources, some community members
described being a long distance from sites of cultural signiﬁcance, including
burial grounds. This represents a slow erosion of cultural connection to land, as
villagers are less able to visit cultural sites and practice ceremonies.
Similarly, villagers also suffer in terms of constrained access to education and
health services. Villagers are often overlooked by both the company and govern-
ment in terms of the delivery of vital services  including health and educational
service provision  due to their location on land that is neither clearly the
responsibility of public or private interests. While the company has engaged in
some social service delivery as part of its broader corporate social responsibility
agenda (see for example Lyons & Westoby, 2016), these initiatives fall well short
of community needs.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
What is the future for rural Africa? In the West’s historical oscillation between
wonder and exploitation of African territories exist populations whose very live-
lihoods and sense of place in the world are threatened. As we have discussed in
this paper, the conditions that allow for current exploitative practices by trans-
national companies were established during early post-colonial periods in
Africa, in which young inexperienced and authoritarian regimes, with their own
political agendas and poor legal and rights frameworks, cooperated with foreign
concerns to accept economic schemes deleterious to their own populations. The
case of structural adjustment in Zimbabwe during the 1990s, with its resulting
harm, is one such case. While the parallel application of a villagization program
at the local level illustrated how combinations of initiatives, at various scales,
can act to produce suffering structured into the very fabric of lives. Similarly,
25 years later, industrial plantation forestry in Uganda  as part of the broader
neoliberalization of nature and natural resources  has shown a comparative
problematic of exploitation, including where transnational capital plays a key
role as arbiter of social suffering.
As we demonstrated, these forms of slow and structural violence, articulated
through economic and land use policies, have had profound negative effects on
target populations. Escobar (1995) suggested that development consisted of a
coherent approach with processes of subjectiﬁcation of populations, technicali-
zation of established local economies, and propagation of education based on
values of the centre. In both our case studies, we observed elements of Escobar’s
argument. For example, in Zimbabwe, the combination of a coherent economic
structural adjustment policy applied at the national level and technical changes
to local farming practices in Zimbabwe (via the MZP) in which pre-existing
knowledge of the environment was ignored, placed food security at risk and con-
tributed to serious hunger. Similarly, the more observably violent dispossession
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of land in our Ugandan case study, with its land grabs and resulting food insecu-
rity, and reconﬁguration of local systems of meaning through destruction of
burial sites, illustrated a high degree of planning and instrumentality. However,
as ethnographers, we also acknowledge that local politics and circumstances
render the application of development initiatives inconsistent. For this reason,
we also agree with Ferguson’s (1994) contention that development occurs
through a conjunction of political, economic, social, and environmental features
that produce unintended results. In Zimbabwe, economic structural adjustment
was meant to strengthen the economy through liberalization of trade and other
features, but lack of investment in infrastructure, coupled with drought, had the
opposite result. In another example, the MZP was meant to enable small scale
farmers to earn cash and improve their position in the economy, however, the
process of implementation served to strengthen regional authorities and further
disenfranchise already politically marginalised rural populations. In Uganda,
planned evictions from land created space for Green Resources to establish their
business, but it also deprived local populations of viable livelihoods and con-
founded their ability to manage day to day living through, for example, con-
straints on water and fuel sources. Good planning could have mitigated these
impacts, but as Ferguson (1994) argued, development is characterized by politi-
cal processes not necessarily related to the objectives of projects.
Development has brought about much suffering. It does not have to be this
way. Anxiety for wildly uncertain futures, chronic powerlessness, hunger, and
illness are avoidable. We argue that to mitigate these conditions, to take another
road politically, it is helpful to understand the historical antecedents of the cur-
rent architecture of exploitation. Adopting case studies from eastern and south-
ern Africa across a span of 25 years, we have elicited a number of common
themes related to land use.
First, we note that the modernist development project has created new open-
ings for transnational capital, including as evidenced with the application of
structural adjustment in Zimbabwe in the 1990s and privatization of industrial
plantation forestry in Uganda in the contemporary period. This privatization
has driven adverse social impacts, which are slow, and structural. It is also
directly tied to national and international policies that, in design, do not account
for the potential, and historically veriﬁed, adverse human impacts and social suf-
fering. These outcomes include crises in food and water security, dispossession
from sites of cultural signiﬁcance and disconnection from the social and ecologi-
cal worlds which are fundamental to meaning and social reproduction. In
Zimbabwe, the MZP removed land-use decision-making from the hands of local
authorities and, thus, reduced the voice of local populations who spoke through
both hereditary and postcolonial representatives. In Uganda, dispossession from
land in seemingly arbitrary forms created crucial alienations from the very suste-
nance of life. Increasing fragility of livelihoods is a feature of both of our cases
studies.
Second, we argue that privatization of land and the rise of transnational
capital, in which the ethics of development are outsourced to private actors, are
failing crucial ethical tests in terms of impacts for populations. Are these the
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unintended consequences of development? In the case of the MZP, great techni-
cal shortfalls in project design, including use of outdated measurements, poor
reading of environmental conditions, and neglect to account for readily avail-
able historical records, resulted in avoidable upheavals and torment for target
populations. In the case of Uganda, the effects appear to be less unintended and
more instrumental. Poor impact assessment and neglect to acknowledge the
observable and reported effects of the initiative appear to be to blame for the
reported suffering. Our ﬁndings point to the profound ethical short comings of
the so-called new green development paradigm.
The modernist development project, as articulated in this paper to include
both structural adjustment in Zimbabwe and carbon trading in Uganda, drives
accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003), and has delivered mixed results
at the local level. In contrast to capital accumulation by expanded reproduction
within an economic system, this approach involves predation and violent expro-
priations of land and resources as a way to gain new horizons for capital accu-
mulation. Many of the adverse impacts of such projects also remain poorly
understood on the basis of limited measurements of impact, including con-
strained impact assessment processes. We conclude that the development project
has created structures of violence and a culture of acceptance of local level suf-
fering. The very nature of violence and dispossession we have described is struc-
tural, and is based upon an accumulation by dispossession. Structural change
will be required to address these slow nefarious forms of violence, and further
ethnographic work. More than simply standard poverty and health measure-
ments will be necessary to both gauge social suffering as well as establish appro-
priate responses.
NOTE
1. In the 1990s, the governance structure of the Communal Lands was composed of a
hierarchy of Wards, Village Development Committees, and then individual villages.
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